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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______ 
 
No. 11-2213 
______ 
 
MAHMOUD MANAA-ATALLAH, 
         Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
         Respondent 
______ 
 
On Petition for Review of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A035-741-972) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Walter Durling 
______ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 15, 2012 
 
Before:  SMITH, FISHER and GARTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: May 16, 2012) 
 
 
______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge. 
 Petitioner Mahmoud Manaa-Atallah was ordered removed from the United States.  
Upon an application for relief under the Convention Against Torture, he was granted 
deferral of removal.  On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals denied Manaa-Atallah 
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deferral of removal and ordered him removed to Jordan.  Manaa-Atallah petitioned this 
court for review, alleging several errors by the Board of Immigration Appeals.  We will 
deny Manaa-Atallah‟s petition for review. 
I. 
       We write principally for the benefit of the parties and recite only the facts essential to 
our disposition. 
Manaa-Atallah is a native and citizen of Jordan, having been born in the area 
known as the West Bank in 1959, while that region was part of Jordan.  Manaa-Atallah 
entered the United States in 1978 as a lawful permanent resident on a Jordanian passport.  
Beginning in 1986, Manaa-Atallah was arrested and convicted for a series of offenses 
relating to various thefts, which culminated in a 1995 conviction for robbery, robbery of a 
motor vehicle, theft by unlawful taking, and receiving stolen property.  On the basis of 
these convictions, Manaa-Atallah was sentenced to incarceration of three and a half to 
fifteen years.  That sentence was later vacated by the Pennsylvania court that originally 
imposed it.
1
 
In 1999, the Immigration and Naturalization Service issued Manaa-Atallah a 
Notice to Appear charging him with removability for the commission of two or more 
crimes involving moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).  In 2006, the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) further charged Manaa-Atallah with 
                                              
1
 The record does not disclose the basis on which Manaa-Atallah‟s sentence was vacated.  
His convictions, however, remain of record. 
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removability for the commission of an aggravated felony in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  The convictions for which Manaa-Atallah was charged with 
removability were all part of the 1995 conviction for multiple offenses. 
During the course of removal proceedings, Manaa-Atallah claimed that he had 
never been convicted of aggravated felonies or crimes of moral turpitude because he had 
not been properly sentenced for his 1995 convictions.
2
  The Immigration Judge rejected 
this argument, and found that Manaa-Atallah was eligible for deferral of removal only 
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  Manaa-Atallah thereafter filed an 
application to defer his removal along with a personal statement, seeking relief under 
CAT. 
Manaa-Atallah testified in support of his CAT application, addressing his fears 
about returning to Israel or Jordan.  Specifically, Manaa-Atallah claimed that he had sold 
his land in the West Bank to Israeli settlers in 1980.  Manaa-Atallah claimed that after 
that sale, villagers in his home village threatened his family, and claimed that Hamas 
placed advertisements in a local newspaper condemning him and his family and placing a 
fatwa against him, directing that he should be killed.  Manaa-Atallah further claimed that 
at least one of his relative‟s homes had been firebombed and subjected to gunfire. 
On May 27, 2008, the IJ issued an oral decision granting Manaa-Atallah deferral 
of removal to Israel, the West Bank, and Jordan.  The IJ restated that Manaa-Atallah was 
                                              
2
 The record does not disclose any information concerning Manaa-Atallah‟s alleged 
“improper” sentencing. 
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an aggravated felon, but nevertheless concluded that he would be tortured if he were to 
return to the West Bank.  DHS appealed the IJ‟s decision to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”). 
On appeal to the BIA, Manaa-Atallah filed a response to DHS, but did not appeal 
the IJ‟s determination that he was an aggravated felon for immigration purposes.  On 
November 28, 2008, the BIA granted DHS‟ appeal and denied CAT protection to Manaa-
Atallah.  The BIA found that Manaa-Atallah had provided no evidence that he would be 
tortured if he were removed to Jordan.  Further, relying on the lack of corroborating 
evidence, the BIA concluded that even if Manaa-Atallah was credible, he had not shown 
that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured if he were returned to Israel, 
Jordan, or the West Bank.  The BIA also held that the risk of torture by Hamas does not 
qualify for CAT protection because Israel, not Hamas, is the governing authority in the 
West Bank.  The BIA remanded to the IJ to designate a country of removal. 
On remand, Manaa-Atallah sought to have the removal proceedings reopened, 
claiming that he had additional relevant information.  On June 22, 2010, the IJ granted 
the motion to reopen removal proceedings.  Manaa-Atallah introduced various types of 
evidence purportedly establishing the threat that he would be tortured if he were removed 
to the West Bank or Jordan.  On November 8, 2010, the IJ issued a written decision 
granting Manaa-Atallah‟s application for deferral of removal under CAT.  The DHS 
appealed this decision, and on April 27, 2011, the BIA sustained the appeal, finding that 
the IJ‟s determination that Manaa-Atallah had demonstrated a clear probability of torture 
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was clearly erroneous.
3
  Inasmuch as the IJ had not designated a country of removal, the 
BIA instructed that Manaa-Atallah should be removed to Jordan.  Manaa-Atallah 
petitioned this court for review. 
II. 
 On appeal, Manaa-Atallah raises several claims.  First, he contends that because 
the sentence for his 1995 convictions was vacated, those convictions cannot properly 
serve as the basis for his removability.  Second, he contends that the BIA erroneously 
required him to satisfy an impermissibly high burden of proof to demonstrate his 
entitlement to relief under CAT.  Finally, he contends that the BIA erred in its application 
of the “clearly erroneous” standard while reviewing the IJ‟s decision. 
A. 
Manaa-Atallah claims that we have jurisdiction over his petition for review 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  The government, however, contends that we lack proper 
jurisdiction to review most of Manaa-Atallah‟s claims.  “Before we reach the merits of 
[Manaa-Atallah‟s] petition, we must first address the government‟s argument that we lack 
jurisdiction over [some] portion[s] of [his] petition.”  Pareja v. Attorney General, 615 
F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2010). 
                                              
3
  While that appeal was pending before the BIA, on March 24, 2011, Manaa-
Atallah filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  Although counsel did not advise us of this development, that petition was 
denied as moot on October 21, 2011. 
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Prior to seeking review in this court, an alien must “exhaust[] all administrative 
remedies available to the alien as of right.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).  This court has 
previously recognized that such “issue exhaustion as required by § 1252(d)(1) is a 
jurisdictional rule.” Hoxha v. Holder, 559 F.3d 157, 159 n.3 (3d Cir. 2009).  To properly 
exhaust administrative remedies, an alien must make “some effort, however insufficient, 
to place the Board on notice of a straightforward issue being raised on appeal.”  Yan Lan 
Wu v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 418, 422 (3d Cir. 2005).   
The government claims that Manaa-Atallah failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies with regard to his claim that his 1995 convictions did not qualify as grounds for 
removability.  We agree.   
In his brief to this court, Manaa-Atallah claims that because his sentence for his 
1995 convictions was vacated and never properly reinstated, the convictions were not 
final for immigration purposes, and therefore could not serve as the basis for removability 
for a conviction for an aggravated felony.  Manaa-Atallah raised a similar issue before 
the IJ, but the IJ characterized his argument as a collateral attack on his criminal 
convictions and determined that the IJ was precluded from considering such arguments.  
Manaa-Atallah did not appeal that determination to the BIA. 
It is not clear whether Manaa-Atallah‟s argument is properly characterized as an 
attack on the legality of his convictions, or a challenge to the removal order against him.  
In either case, however, we lack jurisdiction to consider the argument.  If his claim is an 
attack on the legality of his convictions, those “convictions are no longer in their own 
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right open to direct or collateral attack.  Thus, [Manaa-Atallah] is without recourse.”  
Drakes v. I.N.S., 330 F.3d 600, 604 (3d Cir. 2003).  If his claim is a challenge to the 
removal order, Manaa-Atallah‟s failure to appeal the IJ‟s determination that he was an 
aggravated felon to the BIA renders the claim unexhausted.  Such a “due process claim[] 
. . . could have been argued before the BIA, and [Manaa-Atallah‟s] failure to do so is thus 
fatal to our jurisdiction” over such a claim.  Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 448 
(3d Cir. 2005). 
B. 
The government also claims that we lack jurisdiction to consider Manaa-Atallah‟s 
claim that the BIA held him to an improperly high standard to establish his entitlement to 
relief under CAT.  We agree. 
Manaa-Atallah claims that the BIA: 1) erroneously required corroborating 
evidence despite the IJ‟s finding that his testimony was credible; 2) improperly 
disregarded probative evidence that supported his CAT claim; and 3) as a result of these 
two errors, cumulatively required Manaa-Atallah to meet a higher standard than required 
to establish his entitlement to CAT relief. 
With certain exceptions, “no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order 
of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed” an 
aggravated felony.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).  Among the enumerated exceptions to that 
rule, a court may still undertake “review of constitutional claims or questions of law 
raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals.”  8 U.S.C. § 
 8 
1252(a)(2)(D).  To determine whether we properly have jurisdiction to consider Manaa-
Atallah‟s claims regarding the BIA‟s review of evidence and the standard applied in 
determining his entitlement to CAT relief, we must determine whether he is raising a 
constitutional or legal claim. 
Manaa-Atallah‟s first argument is that the BIA erroneously required him to 
provide evidence which corroborated his testimony when the credible evidence of his 
testimony was sufficient to meet his burden of proof on CAT eligibility.  Manaa-Atallah 
styles this argument as a claim that the BIA applied an improper legal standard by failing 
to de facto accept his credited testimony as sufficient evidence to support CAT relief.   
The regulation on which Manaa-Atallah‟s argument relies, 8 C.F.R. § 
208.16(c)(2), specifies that the “[t]he testimony of the applicant, if credible, may be 
sufficient to sustain the burden of proof [for CAT relief] without corroboration.”  In 
interpreting identical language, this Court has noted that “[s]aying that something may be 
enough is not the same as saying that it is always enough; in fact, the most natural 
reading of the word „may‟ in this context is that credible testimony is neither per se 
sufficient nor per se insufficient.”  Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 552 (3d Cir. 2001).  
In other words, whether uncorroborated credible testimony constitutes sufficient evidence 
to sustain CAT relief depends on the weight the agency accords to the credible testimony.  
“[A]rguments such as that an [IJ] or the BIA incorrectly weighed evidence, failed to 
consider evidence or improperly weighed equitable factors are not questions of law under 
§ 1252(a)(2)(D).”  Jarbough v. Attorney General, 483 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2007).  We 
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therefore conclude that we lack jurisdiction to consider Manaa-Atallah‟s claim that the 
BIA improperly required him to corroborate his testimony. 
We also conclude that we lack jurisdiction to review Manaa-Atallah‟s claim that 
the BIA improperly disregarded probative evidence in support of his CAT claim, as 
arguments pertaining to an alleged failure to consider evidence do not give rise to 
“questions of law under § 1252(a)(2)(D).”  Id.  Inasmuch as Manaa-Atallah‟s arguments 
concerning the CAT standard do not present a constitutional or legal claim and thus do 
not fall into the exception permitting our jurisdiction, we may not review those claims. 
III. 
 Having resolved the jurisdictional issues presented by the appeal before us, we 
now turn to Manaa-Atallah‟s remaining claim.  Manaa-Atallah contends that the BIA 
improperly applied the “clearly erroneous” standard of review in its review of the IJ‟s 
decision.  We conclude that the BIA did not err in its application of the clearly erroneous 
standard. 
 Because the BIA overturned the IJ‟s decision, we review the BIA‟s decision, 
rather than the IJ‟s decision.  Abdulai, supra, 239 F.3d at 548-49.  Although we ordinarily 
review an agency determination that an individual is not eligible for CAT protection 
under the “substantial evidence” standard,  Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 170 (3d 
Cir. 2002), Manaa-Atallah‟s claim that the BIA misapplied a legal standard is a legal 
claim, over which we exercise de novo review.  See, e.g., Pieschacon-Villegas v. 
Attorney General, 671 F.3d 303, 310 (3d Cir. 2011) (subjecting several issues, including 
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whether the BIA properly applied a legal standard, to de novo review as “legal 
determinations.”). 
 When reviewing an IJ‟s CAT determination, the BIA is to review “factual findings 
under a „clearly erroneous‟ standard, and [apply] . . . a de novo standard of review in 
determining whether the claimed discrimination or mistreatment would constitute torture 
under the legal framework.”  Kaplun v. Attorney General, 602 F.3d 260, 272 (3d Cir. 
2010).  The BIA can hold a factual finding clearly erroneous “when although there is 
evidence to support it, the reviewing [Board member or panel] on the entire evidence is 
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”  United 
States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).  The BIA cannot overturn a 
finding of fact simply because it would have made a different factual determination had it 
been the factfinder.  Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). 
 We note, at the outset, that the BIA is entitled to a presumption of regularity in its 
review.  Accordingly, the “burden of proof rests with the party alleging irregularity.”  
Frisby v. U.S. Dep‟t of Housing and Urban Development, 755 F.2d 1052, 1055 (3d Cir. 
1985).  Manaa-Atallah has failed to carry his burden of proof.   
 Manaa-Atallah claims that the BIA erred when it found the following to be clearly 
erroneous: 1) the IJ‟s determination that he would be tortured if removed to the West 
Bank; 2) the IJ‟s determination that he would be tortured if removed to Israel; and 3) the 
IJ‟s determination that he would be tortured if removed to Jordan. 
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 In overturning the IJ‟s finding with regard to the West Bank, the BIA reviewed the 
evidence that was before the IJ, and concluded that it could not support a finding that 
Manaa-Atallah faced a clear probability of torture.  Specifically, the BIA determined that, 
in reaching his determination, the IJ had relied on speculation from a lay witness, 
speculation that two separate organizations would cooperate to enforce a thirty year old 
fatwa, and a single unauthenticated document.  The BIA pointed out that this evidence 
was unreliable, and additionally considered the fact that Manaa-Atallah had twice applied 
to return to the West Bank or returned to the West Bank since 1980.  Taken together, the 
BIA was correct that the IJ committed clear error in finding that Manaa-Atallah faced a 
clear probability of torture in the West Bank. 
 Manaa-Atallah conceded that he did not fear torture if removed to Israel; 
accordingly, the BIA committed no error in concluding that he faced no clear probability 
of torture in Israel.  As to Jordan, Manaa-Atallah contends that the IJ did not commit 
clear error when it concluded that he faced a clear probability of torture on the basis of a 
law which punished individuals who sold land to Israelis and a newspaper article 
detailing an arrest for such a sale.  We disagree.  The law to which Manaa-Atallah refers 
was repealed in 1968, and Manaa-Atlallah provided no evidence that he would face 
arrest, nor any evidence that such arrest would constitute torture.  Accord Berishaj v. 
Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 332-333 (3d Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Nbaye v. 
Attorney General, 666 F.3d 57 (3d Cir. 2011), (something more than “scattered” reports 
of torture is required to sustain a finding of clear probability of torture). 
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IV. 
 Because the BIA properly applied the “clearly erroneous” standard of review, and 
because we lack jurisdiction to consider Manaa-Atallah‟s other claims, we will deny 
Manaa-Atallah‟s petition for review. 
